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Counterfactual Situations and Moral Worth 
Kelly Sorensen 





What is the relevance to praiseworthiness and blameworthiness of what one would have done in 
other, counterfactual circumstances?  I defend a moderate form of actualism: what one would 
have done is important, but less so than what one actually does. 
 
Keywords 






 It might not have been the way it was: Oskar Schindler might have been born in another 
era, or might have chosen to be something else than an entrepreneur and war profiteer – or might 
have chosen to ignore the plight of his workers.  And any of these differences probably would 
have led to hundreds more deaths.  If Schindler were born in another era, he likely would have 
lacked the distinctive opportunity to save many lives. If he had chosen another line of work, he 
might not have been able to protect Jewish workers.  Or Schindler might have been situated as he 
was but simply chose differently: he might have failed to respond to the plight of his workers and 
thus made himself like far too many of his contemporaries.  In these alternative possibilities, we 
would never have known about Schindler’s particular moral excellence.  Maybe he would have 
never had that particular moral excellence. 
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What is the relevance of these counterfactual circumstances and choices to Schindler’s 
moral worth?  By his “moral worth,” I mean Schindler’s deserved praiseworthiness and 
blameworthiness.  I do not mean the praise and blame that others might casually happen to direct 
toward his observable actions.  Instead I mean a moral evaluation of the factors more clearly 
relevant to Schindler’s admirability as an agent: his motives, intentions, traits, and so on.  What 
we might call the metaethics of moral worth will not be particularly important in the discussion 
that follows – that is, whether moral worth is best understood in terms of informed Strawsonian 
reactive attitudes, or in terms of motives and intentions as bearers of intrinsic value, or in some 
other way.  Instead the focus is simply on what admiration Schindler deserves, especially in light 
of how things might have been otherwise. 
 We can think of how things might have been otherwise in terms of the notion of other 
possible worlds.  Among all possible ways things might have been, the actual world is the 
possible world that actually obtains.  Some near possible worlds are very similar to the actual 
world, differing only in morally trivial ways: the particular bottle of wine Schindler uses to bribe 
committed Nazis, the color of his suit.  For most of the issues in this paper we will have no need 
to distinguish among these trivially-different worlds; call a set of near possible worlds that differ 
from the actual world in only morally trivial ways a counterfactual situation.
1
  Other near 
possible worlds are similar to the actual world but contain morally non-trivial elements: for 
instance, the moment in the early 1940s when Schindler learns about the murder of Jewish 
                                                 
1
 I will also generally use the term “actual situation” instead of “actual world” for claims about moral worth in what 
follows.  The actual situation includes the actual world (itself also a possible world) plus those possible worlds that 
differ from the actual world in only morally trivial ways.  This is a somewhat unusual grouping, but it should create 
no problems for the arguments below.  See also footnote 12. 
3 
 
children, “galvanizing” him to act.
2
  It is one situation (a collection of near possible worlds) if 
Schindler learns about the children, another situation if he does not.  
 Schindler’s configuration of motives might be such that he saves hundreds of people in 
proportionally many or most situations.  Or it might be such that he saves hundreds in few or no 
situations.
3
  Does it make a difference to Schindler’s moral worth which of these two is the case?  
To ask this question, we need to distinguish manifest or occurrent motives, intentions, effort and 
other factors from modal or dispositional motives, intentions, effort, and other factors.
4
  The 
motives Schindler has in the actual situation are manifest motives.  The motives Schindler would 
                                                 
2
 See Thomas Keneally, Schindler’s List (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), pp. 127-33, 260; David Crowe, 
Oskar Schindler (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), pp. 194-95.  I thank Bob Adams for a discussion about 
Schindler that led me to ask the questions in this paper.  For valuable comments, I also thank Shelly Kagan, Allen 
Wood, Roger Florka, Stewart Goetz, Apryl Martin, the anonymous referees, and various audiences who heard an 
earlier draft of this paper. 
 Distinguishing between morally trivial and morally non-trivial differences may be difficult in some cases.  I 
will not distinguish the two in any precise way; I trust that our sense of the difference is reliable enough in most 
cases for the claims I want to make in this paper. 
3
 It is important to emphasize that situations are sets of near possible worlds with morally trivial differences.  There 
may be very far possible worlds where Schindler in fact tortures his factory workers or works as a sadistic guard at 
Auschwitz – after all, possible worlds talk is metaphysical talk, and metaphysically anything like this is possible.  
But there may well be no situations – again, near possible worlds – where Schindler does these monstrous things.   
What an agent would do in far possible worlds has little or no relevance to her moral worth, so we will 
ignore them, because there is a far possible world where not only Schindler but Mother Teresa and Siddartha 
Gautama too are sadistic torturers.  Far possible worlds tell us little distinctive about individual agents.  Far possible 
worlds indict us all, or all of us not at all; so we have little reason to attend to them. 
4
 For exegetical simplicity I will abbreviate the list of relevant moral worth factors in future references: I will simply 
talk in terms of the moral worth of motives.   
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have in counterfactual situations – that is, would actually have if a possible world were actual – 
are modal motives.  One central question of this paper is whether modal motives matter to moral 
worth.  Let me ask the same question using another term.  “Robustness” concerns the 
configuration of motives, intentions, effort, and other factors that an agent has across 
counterfactual situations.  Does moral worth vary with robustness? 
 If Schindler saves hundreds in many or most situations, his morally worthy motives are 
robust.  If he saves hundreds in few situations, his morally worthy motives are not robust.  I think 
that robustness is relevant to moral worth, and importantly so.  I also think the actual situation 
plays a particularly weighty role in evaluations of robustness and moral worth.  In this paper I lay 
out some possible views about robustness and defend what I take to be the most plausible view. 
 
1. Five Positions about Moral Worth 
 There are five general positions about the relevance of counterfactual situations to moral 
worth.  (1) One might think the actual situation is the only situation that matters; call this Strong 
Actualism.  (2) One might think all situations, counterfactual and actual, matter equally; call this 
Equalism.
5
  (3) One might think that actual and counterfactual situations both matter, but that the 
actual situation matters more than any counterfactual situation; call this Moderate Actualism.  (4) 
One might think that actual and counterfactual situations both matter, but that (at least some) 
individual counterfactual situations matter more than the actual situation; call this Moderate 
                                                 
5
 The claim that “all situations matter equally” is ambiguous between two positions: (1) all situations where the 
person exists matter equally (since there are some situations where the person does not exist); and (2) in principle all 
situations matter, and count equally, but situations where the person does not exist have zero weight.  These two 
positions are functionally equivalent, so I will not distinguish between them in what follows. 
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Possibilism.  (5) One might think that counterfactual situations matter but the actual situation 
does not; call this Strong Possibilism.
6
  Let’s examine each of these views in more detail. 
 (1) Strong Actualism is the view that counterfactual situations do not matter morally at 
all; only the actual situation is relevant to moral worth.  On this view, what Schindler would have 
done in other circumstances has no relevance at all to his moral worth.  All that counts are his 
configurations of motives manifest in history as it actually played out.  Motives can be causes, 
and causes always imply something about counterfactual situations; Strong Actualism 
acknowledges this as a metaphysical point, but denies that facts of the matter in counterfactual 
situations matter morally.  It does not matter whether Schindler would have saved hundreds in 
many counterfactual situations or none outside the actual situation.  Robustness is irrelevant to 
moral worth. 
 (2) Instead one might be an egalitarian or Equalist about moral worth and counterfactual 
situations.  Here the actual situation has no special moral worth weight just because it is the 
actual situation.  Instead, it counts exactly the same as any situation.  Whatever might be 
metaphysically important about actuality over mere possibility, from the point of view of moral 
worth all situations count the same.  To determine the moral worth of Schindler’s rescue 
motives, we sum up the number of situations in which he has morally praiseworthy rescue 
motives – or more accurately, since there are an infinite number of situations, we look at that 
proportion of situations that include the motives at issue.
7
  Each situation counts the same: the 
                                                 
6
 The terms “actualism” and “possibilism” are often used in a purely ontological sense.  In this paper I use them only 
for positions about moral worth.  When I introduce metaphysical positions below, I will use different terms: modal 
realism, abstractionism, and fictionalism. 
7
 It is problematic to talk about the “number” or “proportion” of situations or possible worlds, since there are an 
infinite number of them.  For the purposes of the rough positions I am offering in this paper, I will set aside these 
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state of Schindler’s motives manifest in the actual situation is no more significant to the 
praiseworthiness of these motives than his motives in counterfactual situations where he has a 
different career or chooses not to aid. 
 (3) On Moderate Actualism, both actual and possible situations have moral worth weight, 
but the actual situation has more.  It matters whether Schindler’s motive to rescue is a fluke, a 
rarity, or not: his actions in counterfactual situations constitute, at least in part, his moral worth.  
What Schindler would have done counterfactually makes up his broader character.  But in fact 
Schindler really had manifest rescue motives in the actual situation, and this seems to be 
significant in some special way.  Even if what Schindler would do in alternative circumstances 
matters, what he did in the actual circumstances matters most.  The Moderate Actualist must 
answer two questions irrelevant to the first two views: what is the relative special moral worth 
weight of the actual situation – i.e., how much more does it matter than other situations?  And 
might counterfactual situations count differentially (more or less than one another)?  If so, what 
are the criteria for which counterfactual situations count the most? 
 (4) The Moderate Possibilist also believes that both actual and counterfactual situations 
have moral worth weight.  But in this case the view is that the actual situation counts less than 
one or more counterfactual situations.  What Schindler does in the actual situation is less 
important to the moral worth of his rescue motives than what he does in one or more other 
counterfactual situations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
technical problems.  Everything I say is fine for finite sets of situations.  (Alternatively, one might think in terms of 
probabilities instead of possible worlds.)  For some strategies for dealing with related problems regarding infinite 
numbers in ethics, see Peter Vallentyne and Shelly Kagan, “Infinite Value and Finitely Additive Value Theory,” 
Journal of Philosophy 94:1 (1997), pp. 5-26. 
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 (5) Finally, the Strong Possibilist believes that the actual situation does not count at all!  
Somehow, the property of actuality strips the actual situation of its relevance to moral worth.  If 
we want to know how praiseworthy Schindler’s motives are, the actual situation is the last place 
to look. 
 Which of these positions is correct?  Metaphysics cannot save us here.  Someone might 
think that the best way to adjudicate among these views is to determine the best metaphysical 
position, letting the best moral position fall naturally out of that.  But even if we were supremely 
confident about our modal metaphysics – a tall order, given the opposing positions taken here by 
smart people – a metaphysical position would not necessarily entail an answer about moral 
worth.  Why think that it should?  Metaphysical theories are about what things are, not whether 
they matter.  Rival metaphysical positions are almost always morally neutral.  A decision 
between moral realism and emotivism would not necessarily tell us whether to be 




 My claim is not that metaphysics does not matter at all, or that it never matters.  Taking a 
given metaphysical position may make belief in certain moral positions somewhat more or less 
costly, requiring one to bite fewer or more other philosophical bullets.  The claim is simply that a 





                                                 
8
 I owe these lines to Shelly Kagan. 
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2. Some Arguments for Moderate Actualism 
 An answer to the question about moral worth and counterfactual situations will have to 
rest on moral, not metaphysical, arguments.  For simplicity, I will suppose from here on that we 
are metaphysical abstractionists (or as David Lewis calls us, ersatzists): i.e., those who believe 
that counterfactuals are significant, but not ontologically significant in the way the actual world 
is.  This is a modest stipulation: for all the respect we have for David Lewis’s philosophical 
genius, most of us remain unrepentant metaphysical abstractionists; and fictionalists can slip in 
the usual qualifications about possible worlds talk.
9
  What should we now say about moral 
worth?  How should we adjudicate among the five positions from section 1? 
 I believe that we can boil down the five candidate positions to three fundamental claims 
or prongs: 
 
(1)  The actual situation counts for something – that is, it has at least some moral worth 
weight. 
(2)  The actual situation counts more than any other individual counterfactual situation. 
(3)  One or more other counterfactual situations count for something – that is, one or 
more counterfactual situations have at least some moral worth weight. 
 
If we can determine whether each of these prongs is true or false, we should be able to identify 
the correct position about modality and moral worth.  The truth or falsity of each of these claims, 
                                                 
9
 For a defense of what I am calling metaphysical abstractionism, see Alvin Plantinga, “Actualism and Possible 
Worlds,” in Michael J. Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), pp. 253-73; 
and Robert M. Adams, “Theories of Actuality,” Nous 8 (1974), pp. 211-31, reprinted in Loux, The Possible and the 
Actual, pp. 190-209.  See also David Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Gideon Rosen, 
“Modal Fictionalism,” Mind 99 (July 1990), pp. 327-54; and David Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of 
Possibility (New York: Cambridge, 1989). 
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in various combinations, generates all five of the positions discussed above.
10
  I believe that in 
fact all three claims are true, and thus that Moderate Actualism is true.  But let’s allow the 
plausibility of that thesis to emerge naturally as we discuss each of the prongs in turn. 
 
 Prong One.  Start with Prong One – the claim that the actual situation has at least some 
moral worth weight.  This is an important claim: unless it is true, the first four positions (Strong 
Actualism, Equalism, Moderate Actualism, and Moderate Possibilism) are all untenable.  If it is 
false, the fifth position, Strong Possibilism, is the only tenable position.   
 Could the actual situation have no moral worth weight at all?  However counter-intuitive 
it might seem at first, this is not entirely an implausible claim.  A proponent of Strong 
Possibilism might argue for it in this way.  The actual situation is not the appropriate arena for 
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 Here are the details to back up this claim.  Recall the five positions about moral worth from section 1: (A) Strong 
Actualism, (B) Equalism, (C) Moderate Actualism, (D) Moderate Possibilism, and (E) Strong Possibilism.  
Now consider which of these positions can be (logically) true, taking each Prong individually: 
If prong (1) is true, A, B, C, and D could be correct; E cannot be correct. 
If prong (2) is true, A or C could be correct; B, D, and E cannot be correct. 
If prong (3) is true, B, C, D, and E could be correct; A cannot be correct. 
 
Finally, consider what emerges from the truth and falsity of the prongs taken in combination, for a total of eight 
possibilities: 
Prongs (1), (2), and (3) are true: entails that C must be correct. 
Prongs (1) and (2) are true but (3) is false: entails that A must be correct. 
Prongs (1) and (3) are true but (2) is false: entails that either B or D must be correct. 
Prongs (2) and (3) are true but (1) is false: incoherent, since (2) entails (1). 
Prong (1) is true but (2) and (3) are false: incoherent – if (1) is true and (3) is false, (2) must be true. 
Prong (2) is true but (1) and (3) are false: incoherent, since (2) entails (1). 
Prong (3) is true but (1) and (2) are false: entails that E must be correct. 
Prong (1), (2), and (3) are all false: entails that there is no moral worth! 
 
Prong (2) entails Prong (1), but since independent consideration of Prong (1) reveals important issues, we will 
examine it first and independently above.  Note also that in only one combination do we get an indeterminate 
answer: either B or D might be correct if (1) and (3) are true, but (2) is false. 
10 
 
assessing moral worth in the way that a given day’s maneuvers by automobile drivers is not the 
appropriate arena for assessing driving capability.  The only really adequate arena would be an 
agent’s, or a car driver’s, operations under standardized conditions, in some counterfactual 
situations.  We have standardized driver’s license tests, standardized IQ tests, and various other 
standardized tests, precisely for this reason.  An agent’s moral worth is in fact based on her 
performance in standardized, non-actual conditions.  On this view, it is exactly the standardized-
condition counterfactual situations that would be relevant to moral worth, not the actual 
situation!  In that case Prong One would be false: the actual situation would have no moral worth 
weight. 
 Interesting though it is, this position has a fatal difficulty.  It would be very strange to say 
that a given day’s car accidents matter nothing at all to driving capability, or that someone’s 
malicious infliction of pain on another person in the actual situation does not matter at all to his 
moral worth.  I think any appeal this Strong Possibilist argument has owes instead to one or both 
of two other matters.  First, the appeal might be merely epistemological.  Maybe the actual 
situation is epistemologically irrelevant to an agent’s actual moral worth, such that standardized 
conditions would tell us more than what we can know from the actual situation.  But our inquiry 
in this paper is not epistemological: we want to know instead whether the actual situation is 
metaphysically irrelevant to an agent’s actual moral worth.  Insofar as the Strong Possibilist 
argument relies on epistemological intuitions, it does not answer our question.  Second, the 
appeal might come from a sense that the actual situation is in fact metaphysically irrelevant, or 
perhaps not relevant enough, to an agent’s real moral worth.  Put another way, perhaps the 
agent’s motives manifest in the actual situation are not the only constituents of his moral worth.  
But this is far less extreme than saying that his motives as they appear in the actual situation are 
11 
 
not constituents at all.  If this is indeed the appeal behind the standardized conditions argument, 
then the argument does not show that the actual situation has no moral worth weight (and thus 
that Prong One is false).  (A version of the standardized conditions argument could still serve as 
an argument for Equalism, or Moderate Actualism, or even Moderate Possibilism – views on 
which both actual and counterfactual situations have weight.) 
 So the standardized conditions argument does not seem to really show that Prong One is 
false after all.  To reject Prong One, one has to believe that the actual situation is metaphysically 
irrelevant to an agent’s moral worth; and that seems very difficult to believe.
11
 
 Prong One seems true.  This means that Strong Possibilism is false, but the first four 
theories are still live options.  We will need to turn to the other two prongs to tell which is 
correct. 
 
 Prong Two.  The second prong claims that the actual situation counts more than any 
single counterfactual situation.
12
  This is an important claim as well: if it is true, only Strong 
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 We can safely set aside the following degenerate case.  Suppose by luck the agent never actually faces any 
morally significant choices at all; then the actual situation would lack moral worth weight.  But it is hard to imagine 
circumstances such that an agent never faces at least some morally important matters.  
12
 Another note about the term “actual situation” is in order here.  Some are attracted to Prong Two for metaphysical 
reasons: some may think that believing in metaphysical abstractionism gives one some reason to believe in Prong 
Two as well.  But metaphysical abstractionism is about the actual world, not the actual situation; and Prong Two is 
framed in terms of the actual situation; so isn’t this route to Prong Two in trouble?  I think those attracted to Prong 
Two for metaphysical reasons have nothing to fear about the change in terms.  The actual situation does indeed 
include possible worlds that differ in moral trivial ways from the actual world (see footnote 1 above).  But since 
these included possible worlds are in fact morally trivial, this route to Prong Two is no worse off with respect to the 
change in terms. 
12 
 
Actualism and Moderate Actualism can be correct.  I will argue that Prong Two best captures our 
case- and principle- level intuitions about the relative moral weight of the actual and 
counterfactual situations.  Other considerations support Prong Two as well.   
 (A) Consider first the now familiar case of Oskar Schindler.  Schindler is a hero to his 
fictionalizing biographer Thomas Keneally and to director Steven Spielberg.
13
  Keneally and 
Spielberg seem attracted to several features about Schindler – the bare fact that he saved 
hundreds of lives at considerable personal risk when others did nothing, of course, but also other 
matters as well: the fact that his virtues resided among (and in some sense even depended on) 
interesting vices; his risk-taking and boldness in staging the rescue itself; and that he underwent 
a significant moral conversion from selfish war profiteer to compassionate rescuer.  There is no 
question that Schindler is taken as praiseworthy in these works, even though praiseworthy in 
complicated ways.  It matters that Schindler really felt and did these things in the actual 
situation; and Schindler accordingly deserves moral credit.  Others who counterfactually might 
have done what Schindler did, but did not because they were born in other countries, or because 
they were blue collar workers and unable to act on such a scale, or because they had fewer 
opportunities for moral conversion, are not only less interesting as subjects of narrative art, but 
also, I think, less morally praiseworthy.  For example, Keneally seems to think that Julius 
Madritsch, like Schindler an owner of a factory with Jewish workers, might have tried to rescue 
his workers under other, perhaps less complicated, circumstances.  If so, Madritsch attempts a 
rescue in one or more counterfactual situations.  But he did not attempt a rescue in the actual 
                                                 
13
 Thomas Keneally, Schindler’s List.  Spielberg’s 1993 film “Schindler’s List” tracks Keneally’s book relatively 
closely, except for some misguided scenes near the end of the movie.  Somewhat less flattering and more broadly 
researched is David M. Crowe’s Oskar Schindler. 
13 
 
situation; and that seems to make him less morally worthy, ceteris parabis, than Schindler.  The 
example of Madritsch is important here.  Keneally and Spielberg may not have had in mind the 
specific issue of the relative weights of the actual and counterfactual situations.  But nevertheless 
the intuition is there for us to extract: we admire Schindler because he non-counterfactually cared 
about vulnerable people and took action to help them, and did so against a backdrop of moral 
horror.  Our case-level reactions to Schindler support the view that an agent’s motives as they are 
manifest in the actual situation have extra weight.   
(B) The same is true for others we find praiseworthy: Gandhi, Mother Teresa, and more 
modestly someone like tobacco whistleblower Jeffrey Wigand.  However many others might 
have objected to the ethical wrongs of tobacco companies in other circumstances, Wigand 
actually did so publicly, and that matters.  Similar intuitions abound in non-moral cases.  Most of 
us value the actualized violinist skill of Itzak Perlman more than the evident but unactualized 
talent of a promising violin student who gives up (or cannot afford) full days of practice.  Larry 
Bird’s highly actualized abilities were more admirable than the unactualized abilities of possibly 
many like him who do not infallibly practice their basketball fundamentals.   
 (C) In fact these cases are not clear and careful enough.  Perhaps Jeffrey Wigand is 
morally praiseworthy because the actual situation counts more than any counterfactual situation; 
or perhaps instead he is morally praiseworthy because he whistleblows in more possible worlds 
than others.  So these case intuitions underdetermine Prong Two.  All similar real-world cases 
will suffer from the same problem.  We will need to turn to a clean, abstract case. 
Suppose that Veronica and Wendy are both near a drowning toddler (though not 
particularly near each other).  Trees block their visual field, so neither yet knows of the need for 
rescue; each would be motivated to rescue if she knew about the toddler.  In other words, there is 
14 
 
a counterfactual situation where each would have morally worthy rescue motives.  There is an 
additional factor that has an even 50/50 chance of occurring: either the wind blows the trees west 
such that Veronica sees the toddler and is motivated to rescue, or the wind blows the trees east 
such that Wendy sees the toddler and is motivated to rescue.  Assume that whoever sees the 
child, given the particular actual direction of the wind, performs a successful rescue.  So the 
structure of the case excludes both from having actualized rescue motives: 
 If the wind blows east, Veronica has rescue motives and rescues the child. 
If the wind blows west, Veronica has no rescue motives and does not rescue the child. 
 
 If the wind blows west, Wendy has rescue motives and rescues the child. 
If the wind blows east, Wendy has no rescue motives and does not rescue the child. 
 
Suppose the wind blows east: Veronica is the one with manifest rescue motives.  Is Veronica 
more morally worthy than Wendy?  I think so.  The agent with the manifest rescue motives 
seems more praiseworthy.  Veronica is the one with instantiated, active, actual rescue motives. It 
is important to subtract the fact of the successful rescue from our intuitions.  We might do this by 
supposing that what looked like a toddler drowning turned out to be a large doll, and that anyone, 
Veronica and Wendy included, would have mistaken the doll for a toddler.  Still, Veronica seems 
better for manifesting rescue motives, even if she rescued nothing more than a doll.  This 
intuition supports the claim that actual, manifest motives count more than merely possible modal 
motives.  And the argument generalizes: we can run similar cases for other pairs of actual and 
possible motives, such that all actual motives count for more than their merely possible 
counterpart motives. 
(D) Not only case-level intuitions, but also principle-level intuitions support Prong Two.  
For instance, evils in merely counterfactual situations strike us as much less compelling and 
serious than evils in the actual situation.  The firmness of this principle-level intuition is reflected 
15 
 
in the repulsion we feel to a statement such as this: “What is wrong with actualizing evils, since 
they will occur in some other possible world anyway, if they don’t occur in this one?”
14
 
 (E) Prong Two is an instance of a more general claim that is often at work in the history 
of philosophy.  The claim that the actual is more important than the possible, in a non-moral and 
perhaps moral sense as well, is an important premise for Aristotle, Kant, Hegel and others.  
Aristotle thought that natural entities are characterized by change and rest, operating from 
some principle of change and rest internal to them.
15
  This principle of change, or a “nature,” is a 
trajectory toward a favored set of counterfactual situations.  For Aristotle, there is something 
better about those entities which reach maturity by actualizing points later along this trajectory.  
Entities are at their best when they have moved from potential states to actualized states.
16
  “At 
                                                 
14
 The question is raised by Robert M. Adams in “Theories of Actuality,” in Loux, p. 195, against Lewis’s modal 
realism; but I think it is relevant here as well. 
 In fact, Moral Moderate Actualism may seem to give a modal realist like Lewis an answer to Adams’s 
objection on the metaphysical front.  If Lewis opts for Moral Moderate Actualism, he can say that actualizing 
possible evils is bad from the point of view of any counterpart in any possible world (see Lewis, On the Plurality of 
Worlds, pp. 126-28).  That is, since the actual world has special moral weight, even though it has no special 
ontological weight, it is bad to actualize evil in one’s own world.  Thus Adams’s objection seems to lose its point. 
There is a compelling rejoinder available to Adams.  First, Lewis’s answer is ad hoc, especially for Lewis 
himself, since it invokes deontological considerations that Lewis does not want to affirm elsewhere.  Second and 
more seriously, it leaves no room for the relevance of consequences to moral rightness; but any plausible moral 
theory claims that consequences are in some way relevant to moral rightness. 
15
 Aristotle, Physics II.I (192b13-14). 
16
 For related considerations, see Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), especially pp. 102-16, 292-93, and 295-305.  Aristotle believes the best state of a natural 
entity is not only when it actualizes the endpoints of its internal principle of change and rest, but does so actively or 
as an activity.  Activity is the highest level of actuality for a natural entity. 
16 
 
their best” for Aristotle seems to mean both best for them (i.e., in terms of their well-being or 
flourishing) and best from the point of view of praiseworthiness or excellence.  In a sense not 
unrelated to the one we have been considering, the actual has more weight than the possible for 
Aristotle.   
Kant also believed something like this claim, which may come as a surprise to those who 
only know him through the Groundwork.  For Kant, the path to becoming a good human being 
requires both a change of heart and a "gradual reform of sensibility" – that is, a reform of one’s 
sensible or empirical nature.
17
  One’s “sensibility” includes inclinations and passions and other 
mental states that an agent has passively, with no active contribution of his own.  For Kant, 
agents with high moral character have actualized those counterfactual situations where one’s 
sensible nature is brought more into accord with reason and the moral law.  Agents who have 
done so are moral not so much by habit, since that connotes something merely mechanical and 
automatic, but instead by what Kant calls proficiency or facility [Fertigkeit].
18
  Actualizing 
counterfactual situations where one is morally proficient has a very high moral value for Kant.  
That Kant’s considered position is close to Aristotle’s is a surprise to many. 
Hegel claimed something similar.  Of highest value in Hegel’s ethics is the actualization 
of certain human possibilities, with freedom as the centerpiece.  For Hegel, a human being is at 
her best when she has actualized herself through her own activity – that is, when her identity has 
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been formed through her own setting and achieving of ends within concrete social roles in a 
harmonious society.  Important for Hegel is not so much willing to do certain actions in 
counterfactual circumstances, but willing them and doing them in the actual situation.  Mere 
wishes and unactualized dispositions mean little compared to the value of those that issue in 
action in the world.  For Hegel, the actual has special weight.
19
 
 A more general version of Prong Two also seems to play a role in Anselm’s and 
Descartes’s versions of the Ontological Argument.  Among the least controversial of that 
argument’s premises is that it is more perfect to exist in reality than to exist in the mind alone.  A 
related premise strikes many of us as also relatively uncontroversial: it is more perfect to exist in 
actuality than to exist as a mere possibility. 
 (F) Consider another argument for Prong Two; call it the Scaffolding Argument.  The 
most morally worthy motives tend to be strong and reliable loves of goods and hatreds of bads, 
and it is usually not possible to have them ex nihilo.  Having morally worthy motives at high 
levels of strength and stability usually requires that one have earlier instances of them at lower 
levels of strength and stability.  Matters here are not unlike the case of musical or athletic talents: 
Perlman could not play at his peak without playing at a moderate level of capability years before 
that; and playing at a moderate level of capability in turn required previously playing at lower 
levels.  Some mature, strong, reliable motives seem to be like this: instances of them seem to 
require actualizations of less mature instances.  Highly praiseworthy benevolence or 
conscientiousness may require that one first have moderately praiseworthy benevolence or 
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  We can also put it this way: actualization of some of the most morally 
worth motives depends on the actualization of other, often lesser morally worthy motives.  Call 
these lesser motives scaffold motives, since they make stronger and more reliable motives 
possible.   
 We think that scaffold motives are instrumental goods. And we think they are good 
because they are a means to actualizing something – stronger and more reliable motives.  But 
this means that instrumental goods are good because they change the stronger and more reliable 
motives from being merely possible (which they already were without the instrumentally good 
scaffold motives) to actual (for which the instrumentally good scaffold motives are needed).  But 
how could moving something from possible to actual be the source of value for the 
instrumentally good scaffold motives unless it is more morally worthy to be actual than possible?  
So the actual matters more than the possible. 
 
We have seen a number of arguments in favor of Prong Two, but we should turn to an 
important objection.  The objection is that Prong Two relies on intuitions that are in fact only 
epistemic.  The objector says this: we do indeed have intuitions that the actual situation counts 
more than counterfactual situations, but only because it is the one situation we know the most 
about.  We are not confident that we know what agents would do in other counterfactual 
situations; the only reliable evidence we have about their motives is the evidence from the actual 
situation.  The only reason we are attracted to giving the actual situation extra weight is 
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psychological and epistemic in just this way.  Were we not epistemically crippled, we would 
count all counterfactual situations, including the actual situation, the same in moral worth 
evaluations.  Or so the objector says. 
 It is certainly plausible that some of our intuitions in favor of Prong Two owe to 
epistemic limitations; but I do not think all of them do.  We have been supposing in this paper 
that we have a God’s eye view: we have been examining our intuitions about moral worth and 
modality under the assumption that we know what an agent’s motives are like in other 
counterfactual situations.  Even when epistemic limitations are set aside in this way, I find that 
my actualist intuitions in favor of Prong Two survive.  Schindler’s rescue in the actual situation 
still seems morally significant in a way that it would not were it merely possible and unrealized. 
 
 Prong Three.   If Prongs One and Two are correct, then either Strong Actualism or 
Moderate Actualism must be true.  Only these two positions claim that both (1) the actual 
situation has positive moral worth weight, and (2) the actual situation counts more than any other 
individual counterfactual situation.  Strong Actualism and Moderate Actualism disagree about 
Prong Three: whether counterfactual situations have at least some positive moral worth weight.  
I will argue that Prong Three is in fact correct.  Prong Three captures our case- and principle-
level intuitions about the weight of counterfactual situations.  So Moderate Actualism is true. 
 (A) Let’s begin with clean abstract cases.  (We will in fact need two cases for this 
discussion.)  Recall the circumstances of the drowning toddler discussed above.  Consider those 
situations where two agents, Xavier and Yves, both see the toddler and the danger he is in.   
 In the first case, both Xavier and Yves are motivated to rescue the child in the actual 
situation, and in fact both succeed in rescuing the child.  They are equal in all relevant respects in 
20 
 
the actual situation.  But they differ when it comes to counterfactual situations: Xavier rescues in 
all counterfactual situations at issue; Yves rescues in none.
21
  If Prong Three is false, then we 
must conclude that Xavier and Yves are equally morally worthy.  But most of us have the 
intuition in this case that Xavier is more morally worthy than Yves.  Xavier’s rescue motives are 
more rich and robust than Yves’s.   
 This first case is not adequate by itself to support Prong Three.  The first case, taken on 
its own, supports at most a very weak version of Prong Three.  A weak Prong Three says that 
counterfactual situations count only insofar as some related morally worthy motive exists in the 
actual situation.  In other words, counterfactual situation moral worth merely “piggybacks” on 
actual situation moral worth.  But our original Prong Three claims something stronger than this: 
that counterfactual situations matter in their own right, independent of what happens in the actual 
situation.  We will need a second case in order to argue for this stronger claim. 
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 In the second case, both Xavier and Yves are not motivated to rescue the child in the 
actual situation; neither attempts a rescue.  Here we might imagine that the conditions of the 
toddler are such that a rescue is extremely dangerous and unlikely to succeed.  Again both agents 
are equal in all relevant respects in the actual situation.  But again they differ when it comes to 
counterfactual situations: Xavier rescues in all counterfactual situations at issue; Yves rescues in 
none.  If Prong Three is false, then we must conclude that Xavier and Yves are equally morally 
worthy!  But most of us have the intuition in this case that Xavier is far more morally worthy 
than Yves.  I think our intuitions are particularly strong here.  There is no nearby counterfactual 
situation in which Yves rescues – not even when the rescue costs him nothing but brief and 
insignificant effort.  Yves has absolutely no rescue motives, manifest or modal.  It seems very 
difficult to believe that Yves is as morally worthy as Xavier, who is motivated to rescue in all but 
this actual, maximally risk-filled-rescue situation.  So Prong Three is true: counterfactual 
situations matter to moral worth. 
 (B) Schindler’s case supports Prong Three as well.  Here I think it is the interesting 
complications of the Schindler case that help.  It seems to me that whatever positive moral worth 
we think Schindler has because of his motives manifest in the actual situation, the counterfactual 
situations temper or reduce that moral worth weight.  If this is correct – if Schindler’s moral 
worth is lowered by what he would do in counterfactual situations – then counterfactual 
situations matter. 
Despite Keneally’s often hagiographic treatment, one has the sense that Schindler’s 
rescue motives were not particularly robust.  Schindler’s life, both before and after World War II, 
was characterized by a love of risk, and it seems no small attraction to him that saving his 
workers required an exciting mix of daring, boldness, and luck.  Had the rescue been boring and 
22 
 
mechanical, one wonders whether he would have been interested, or at least interested enough to 
see it through.  The success of the rescue itself owes much to raw luck, and also very much to the 
work of the people who assisted him: it is significant that all other major risks he took, again 
both before and after the war, were failures.
22
  There is also the matter of Schindler’s moral 
conversion.  This moral conversion is morally admirable, especially when set alongside the 
failures of his contemporaries.  But the fact that he had to have a conversion – that is, that he had 
to be awakened to the moral weight of the exploitative and later savage circumstances of his 
Jewish workers – in some sense taints his praiseworthiness.  Schindler’s early motives (and to 
some degree even his later motives) seem to have included fear about being found with dirty 
hands after the war.
23
  The point is this: that Schindler needed such a conversion is an indication 
that in many other near counterfactual situations, where the circumstances for such a moral 
conversion were unavailable, he would have had few or no rescue motives.
24
  Not all the 
evidence goes against robustness.  Schindler was generous and benevolent in various 
circumstances, far more so than his contemporaries, and many of his rescuees seem to believe 
that he would have aided them in a number of counterfactual conditions.  He had the sort of 
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dispositions that made his moral conversion possible.  The summary of considerations such as 
these is that while Schindler deserves moral credit for his rescue motives manifest in the actual 
situation, that credit has some limits.  Our intuitions are that Schindler’s rescue motives are not 
entirely stable and robust, and his praiseworthiness has a modest ceiling. 
 All of this fits Prong Three’s picture of moral worth and modality.  Schindler’s heroic 
rescue motives in the actual situation are tempered by his motives in counterfactual situations, 
because counterfactual situations count toward moral worth.
25
 
(C) Prong Three is also intuitively attractive in its own right as a theoretical principle – or 
so it seems to me.  On every metaphysical theory about the nature of motives in counterfactual 
situations, it seems attractive to think that counterfactual situations are relevant to moral worth.  
What one would do counterfactually has moral worth weight because this constitutes the stability 
and robustness of one’s actual motives.  Whether an agent’s motives manifest in the actual 
situation are metaphysically representative of him depends importantly on the shape of those 
motives in counterfactual conditions. 
 (D) Besides case- and principle-level intuitions, the issue of luck supports Prong Three.  
The argument is this: to reject Prong Three is to allow luck to count far too much.  Unless 
counterfactual situations have some moral worth weight, luck plays an inappropriately large role 
in moral worth. 
Schindler’s successful rescue was to a significant extent a matter of luck.  Poldek 
Pfefferberg says that he came close to shooting him when Schindler first came to Poland;
26
 and 
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inspectors of Schindler’s 1944-45 munitions plant nearly discovered that Schindler was ensuring 
that the factory produced bad shells.  Such a discovery would have sent hundreds of people 
(including perhaps Schindler himself) to their deaths.  Luckily this did not happen.  More 
interestingly, perhaps we can identify some moment that is crucial to Schindler’s moral 
conversion – some nexus or narrow passage through which he must pass if he is to develop his 
dispositional benevolence to a level at which he is willing to perform a bold rescue.  That 
moment might be when Stern quotes a key Talmudic verse about rescuing to Schindler,
27
 or the 
moment when Schindler learns of a new level of shameless public brutality from the SS.
28
  
Plausibly, if these circumstances (or ones very much like it) do not luckily occur, Schindler 
remains a mere war profiteer, albeit one with less dispositional cruelty than Amon Goeth and the 
rest of Schindler’s circle of Nazi acquaintances.  Schindler was significantly lucky in both sorts 
of case: Pfefferberg did not shoot, and Schindler had the crucial experiences that set the 
conditions for moral conversion.  The worry here is that luck is exerting an undue or improper 
influence on our moral evaluations.  If the actual situation is all that matters, Schindler smells 
more like a rose than he really is.  To put it in terms I invoked earlier, if Schindler has been 
disproportionately lucky, the actual situation is not metaphysically representative of what his 
motives really are at the end of the war. To say that counterfactual situations have no moral 
worth weight is to count luck far too much. 
 We can imagine a clearer case than Schindler’s – one with fewer temporal changes and 
thus fewer other factors that might be doing moral work.  (A) Suppose Zander has almost 
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entirely morally unworthy dispositions: he is amazingly cruel, self-interested, and callous. In 
exactly one situation his cruelty motive fails and he is instead kind to a stranger.
29
  If this 
situation is the actual situation, and if counterfactual situations do not count at all, we are stuck 
with the view that Zander is morally worthy.  That is a bullet few will be willing to bite.  We 
have a strong sense that Zander’s brief kindness is not metaphysically representative of him – it 
is a fluke, an anomaly, something unusual that comes over him.  (B) Imagine the opposite: 
imagine that in exactly one situation – which turns out to be the actual situation – St. Francis has 
some ill-will towards lepers.  In every other counterfactual situation, St. Francis is benevolent 
and loving to lepers and all others.  St. Francis’s ill-will in the actual situation is metaphysically 
unrepresentative and anomalous. 
 To reject Prong Three is to leave too much of moral worth at the mercy of luck.  Anyone 
who believes that this sort of luck should not exert so strong an influence on praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness will be drawn to the view that counterfactual situations have some moral 
worth weight.  Whatever role luck has in moral worth, its role must have limits. 
 
 With luck on the table, now is a good time to mention another objection to Prong Two.  
This new objection claims that it is inappropriate to count luck at all in moral worth evaluations.  
But Prong Two does let luck count, so it cannot be true.  Prong Two counts luck in the following 
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way.  Which situation is actual is to some degree a matter of luck.
30
  But if the actual situation 
has more moral worth weight than counterfactual situations (as Prong Two claims), then the 
situation that most affects an agent’s moral worth does so partly as a matter of luck.  And this is 
contrary to our deepest views about praiseworthiness and blameworthiness; so Prong Two must 
be false, the objector argues.   
Affirming Prong Three makes matters even worse, the objector continues.  Our last 
argument for Prong Three (“D”) used worries about luck as an argument in favor of Prong Three.  
But the objector thinks that this is an unstable appeal to luck.  If luck is a problem, it is a problem 
all the way down, and is so in a way that the fan of Prong Three cannot accommodate.  The fan 
of Prong Three argues that counting only the actual situation leaves our evaluations too much at 
the mercy of lucky circumstances and results,
31
 such that evaluations based only on the actual 
situation may be unrepresentative of an agent’s true motive robustness; accordingly, 
counterfactual situations count.  But once we are on this path, the objector continues, why not go 
all the way: why not count all the counterfactual situations as much as the actual situation?  For 
only then would the effects of luck be completely mitigated.  In sum, the objector claims that 
Prong Two is false because it lets luck count; and the fan of Prong Two who goes on to also 
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affirm Prong Three is in even more trouble, since an important argument for Prong Three is that 
letting luck count too much is a mistake. 
Note how this objection relies on a very strong premise: that proper moral worth 
evaluations must be stripped of all luck considerations.  The Stoics and perhaps even Kant found 
this premise plausible.  Cicero, for instance, thought that both negligent captains of two different 
ships, one carrying cannonballs, one carrying people, are exactly equally blameworthy for their 
equal negligence in piloting the ships to disaster.  And Kant thought that a good will is good no 
matter what, through luck, “it effects or accomplishes.”
32
  Nevertheless, I do not think the 
premise is compelling in the end.  (Briefly, it has various counterintuitive implications; it is 
difficult to imagine what it would be to mitigate absolutely all influences of luck; and we lose 
some attractive benefits that come when luck plays some role in moral worth evaluations.
33
)  In 
any event, there is nothing logically inconsistent or philosophically implausible in affirming both 
Prongs Two and Three.  To claim that both Prong Two and Prong Three are true is to claim that 
luck plays some role in moral worth (Prong Two) but that this role has limits (Prong Three).   
  
Consider other objections to Prong Three.  The first comes from the radical libertarian.  
Some radical libertarians believe that there are no true propositions corresponding to what an 
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agent would freely do in any other non-actual circumstances,
34
 and that moral worth depends 
only on what an agent would freely do.  If this is the case, the only situation that matters is the 
actual situation, since it is the only situation where there are true propositions about what an 
agent would freely do. Counterfactual situations are not relevant to moral worth. 
 I find radical libertarianism implausibly strong.  What we might call centrist 
libertarianism is less unattractive.  A centrist libertarian believes that not all propositions about 
what agents would freely do in counterfactual situations lack a truth value.  Some propositions of 
this sort are true, and so certain non-actual situations can be relevant to moral worth.  This 
centrist libertarian believes that there is more than one kind of freedom worth wanting.  One kind 
of freedom is that most commonly associated with libertarians: being the unique originating 
cause of a chain of events.
35
  But another kind of freedom is responsiveness to good reasons; and 
this second kind of freedom is compatible with determinism, and so allows for the view that 
some propositions about free actions in counterfactual situations are true.  This centrist 
libertarian believes that both sorts of free choices are valuable and relevant to praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness.
36
  Accordingly, he can still affirm Prong Three: he can believe that there 
exist counterfactual situations with moral worth weight. 
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 Radical libertarians willing to make a certain concession can believe in Prong Three after 
all.  The concession concerns unfree choices – unfree in either the classic libertarian or reasons-
responsiveness compatibilist way just discussed.  A libertarian of any stripe that allows unfree 
choices to count towards moral worth can affirm Prong Three.  For this libertarian, there are 
various motives and other internal states that an agent is not free to originate, keep, or discard, on 
any of the standard accounts of freedom.  The claim is that these states are nevertheless relevant 
to moral worth.  Suppose Smith is brainwashed such that he is subject to cruel desires and 
fantasies.  He is now stuck with these desires and is unable to stop himself from feeling them.  
Even so, this libertarian thinks he is blameworthy for having them: Smith feels shame about 
these states, and he is right to – they are the proper objects of attitudes of shame.
37
  A libertarian 
with this view can accordingly affirm Prong Three.  There exist true propositions about Smith’s 
unfree internal states and motives.  A libertarian can believe these counterfactual situations count 
toward moral worth. 
 The first, centrist libertarian expands the range of what libertarians counts as free; the 
second kind of libertarian counts as relevant to praise and blame elements outside the range of 
freedom.  The two kinds of libertarianism are not mutually exclusive, of course.  Both can also 
affirm Prong Three with no inconsistency. 
 
Centrist libertarians might propose a different objection to Moderate Actualism.  Centrist 
libertarians believe that there are true propositions about what an agent would freely do in some 
non-actual circumstances, but not all.  Call the former determinate cases and the latter 
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indeterminate cases.  The centrist libertarian notes that to believe there are indeterminate cases is 
not yet to say anything about the importance of these cases to moral worth in comparison to 
determinate cases.  A centrist libertarian might claim that the indeterminate cases matter a little, 
a lot, or something in between.  If the indeterminate cases matter substantially, or if they matter 
little but are disproportionately many, or even in fact if they generally matter little but the 
defining choice of one’s life is among the indeterminate cases – say, Luther’s nailing his theses 
to the door – it is possible that most of an agent’s motive robustness is indeterminate.  And this 
may appear to undercut some of the things the Prong Three fan would like to say. 
 I do not think it undermines anything important the Prong Three fan would like to say.  
The prong is untouched: even if there is substantial motive robustness indeterminacy, one can 
still believe that counterfactual situations count.  What the Prong Three fan is unable to offer, if 
centrist libertarians are right, is the final word on an agent’s motive robustness.  But this is no 
crucial loss.  It would simply amount to a limitation on what can be said about motive 
robustness.  About Schindler, a centrist libertarian Prong Three fan can say this: “There may be 
many indeterminate cases – cases in which there is no true proposition about what Schindler 
would freely do – so an assessment of Schindler’s character is based on only the determinate 
cases, where there are true propositions.  And this much can be said: his rescue in the actual 
situation was enough well-motivated to be interestingly praiseworthy, but this praiseworthiness 
is somewhat undercut by the determinate cases in which these rescue motives would not have 
issued in action.”  The lack of true propositions about indeterminate cases does not prevent the 
Prong Three fan from adjusting moral evaluations of actual situation motives in light of the 
31 
 
shape of those motives in determinate cases.  What can be said about robustness still takes the 




 I have argued that Prongs One, Two, and Three are all true.  There is only one position 
that emerges which is compatible with the truth of all three claims: Moderate Actualism.  For the 
Moderate Actualist, the actual situation counts, and counterfactual situations count, but the 
former counts more than the latter.  This position does seem to fit our best intuitions and 
reflection about modality and moral worth. 
 The Moderate Actualist has questions to answer that other positions do not: namely, (I) 
how much more the actual situation matters than other counterfactual situations, and (II) whether 
other counterfactual situations count differentially.  Let me describe some rough and only 
minimally defended answers to these questions.   
(I) Consider three basic answers to the first question.  First, the Moderate Actualist might 
think counterfactual situations count very little – so little that even if in all of them an agent had 
a blameworthy motive, one opposite to his motive in the actual situation, the actual situation 
motive would still count more than all the counterfactual situation motives combined.  Second, 
and on the other extreme, one might think that each counterfactual situation counts nearly as 
much as the actual situation, such that it takes not much of a proportional majority of 
blameworthiness in merely counterfactual situations to outrun praiseworthiness in the actual 
situation.  As few as two counterfactual situations that include blameworthy motives might count 
more than the single actual situation that includes a praiseworthy motive.  I think the truth is 
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somewhere in the middle between these two extremes: a third view is that the actual situation 
weighs considerably more than any single counterfactual situation, but a significant proportion of 
counterfactual situations with one valence can, in some circumstances, outrun an opposing 
valence of the actual situation.  In evaluating moral worth, the actual situation dominates all but a 
significant array of counterfactual situations. 
 This answer to the first question fits the Schindler case.  Schindler’s heroism in the actual 
situation is tempered by what his motives seem to be in counterfactual situations.  On the answer 
at hand, blameworthiness in enough other counterfactual situations can outrun the 
praiseworthiness of motives manifest in the actual situation.  I think this comes imaginably close 
to happening in the case of Schindler.  The counterfactual situations in which Schindler has 
limited or no rescue motives are proportionately many and various and rather near – many and 
various and near enough, I think, to reduce his praiseworthiness.  Nevertheless, Schindler’s 
rescue motives are overall praiseworthy: they are somewhat robust, and importantly, they are 
actual. 
(II) On the second question, counterfactual situations seem to count differentially.  First, 
proximity matters.  Situations closest to the actual situation seem to count the most; situations 
further from it count the least.  Less near counterfactual situations may concern circumstances 
remote enough that they may have little or no bearing on the objects of our evaluation.  Thinking 
about proximity reveals another important way in which the actual situation disproportionally 
influences moral worth: the actual situation sets a center which in turn affects which 
counterfactual situations are nearer and thus more relevant.
39
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Second, the quality of the motives seems to matter.  If an agent has particularly evil (or 
good) motives in a situation or set of situations, even if they are somewhat less near, these 
situations may be as important as proximate situations. 
A fuller account of counterfactuals and moral worth would need to say something about 
the relative weight of these factors – proximity, quality of motive, frequency – and perhaps 
others.  For instance, consider a conflict between proximity and frequency: suppose 
counterfactual situations where Schindler lacks rescue motives are more frequent than situations 
where he has them, but the situations where he does have them are nearest to the actual situation.  
Which factor dominates?  My sense is that proximity counts more: Schindler’s moral 
admirability is more about the near than the many.  But of course more needs to be said about 
these factors and their relations. 
 
3. Moderate Actualism and Situationism  
John Doris and Gilbert Harman, among others, have argued that there are in fact few 
significant differences in moral character among human beings.  Appealing to interesting and 
surprising social science experiments, Doris and Harman argue that people do not differ 
significantly in the likelihood with which they will respond to various morally weighty 
circumstances, such as helping someone in need or distress.  More specifically the claim is this: 
the dominant factor in behavior is not moral character, but rather non-moral features of an 
agent’s situation: whether circumstances are rushed, or whether an unexpected windfall has just 
come her way.  On this view, presumptive differences in motive robustness among people tend 
to wash out across counterfactual situations.  Apparent character differences in fact reduce to 
differences in circumstance luck: the seemingly most virtuous among us are such mostly because 
34 
 
they have been dealt a favorable set of situations in which to act.  Doris and Harman seem to 
believe that there are no significant differences in motive robustness among human agents.  For 
any given motive M, the proportion of M is more or less the same for each agent once all 
counterfactual situations are taken into account.
40
 
A number of premises in this argument are questionable.  A large variety of experiments 
do indicate that character differences play less of a role in human action than ordinary folk 
psychology suggests.  But most of the experiments do indicate at least some low correlation 
between character and behavior.
41
  Doris for one is careful to point out that the studies actually 
show that people are overestimators of the importance of character to action.  A lower than 
expected correlation is still a correlation.  It may well turn out that there are fewer character 
differences among us than folk psychology leads us to expect: the range of human moral worth 
may be surprisingly limited.  But that would be no argument against valuing such differences as 
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there are.  If human motive robustness tops out earlier and less frequently than we have hoped, 
we may have reason to value it all the more for its rarity. 
A second point is this: Doris argues that the correlation between character and action – 
external, observable action – is lower than more people expect.  External, observable action is of 
course what the empirical experiments can test.  What is not accessible for empirical testing is 
the range of internal constituents of character: motive strength and quality, intentions, effort, 
reactive attitudes, and so forth.  Some of these constituents will manifest themselves in external 
behavior; but I think it is plausible to believe that not all of them will, even when test subjects are 
observed under a variety of circumstances.  On the view that these internal items matter to moral 
worth apart from their external consequences – and I have argued elsewhere that they do
42
 – the 
possibility of a broad range of character differences remains. 
But the most important point to make is this.  Doris and Harman seem to think their 
argument shows that all agents have roughly the same moral worth.
43
  If the proportion of any 
given motive M is the same for all agents across all counterfactual situations, they think it 
follows that all agents have the same moral worth.  But there is a hidden premise here: that 
Equalism is true (and thus that Prong Two is false).  But I have argued that Equalism is false; 
Moderate Actualism is instead true.  Even if the rest of the Doris/Harman premises were true, 
Moderate Actualism gives us the resources to maintain that agents differ importantly with 
respect to moral worth.  Agents with actualized good motives are more morally worthy: the 
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circumstantial luck of the actual situation makes for differences in the moral worth of agents 
after all. 
In sum, an idea behind the Doris/Harman arguments seems to be this: the empirical data 
should convince us that there are very few meaningful character differences among us; so we 
should give up making moral worth judgments and give up trying to improve human character.  
But there are few meaningful character differences among us only on the assumption that actual 
and counterfactual situations count the same.  I have tried to show that the cost of thinking so is 
too high. 
